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FROM: Tripoli

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 312, November 12, 1 p.m.

REVIEWED BY *J.M. Rag*

DATE

Control: 6214

Rec'd: November 12, 1957
11:14 a.m.

FDS/EXC/EXC/EXC. DATE

TO: ADJ. GEN.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 312, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 38, BENGHAZI 78.

On November 9th in Benghazi Stackhouse called on Prime Minister Kubar to present MAAG chief Sachs. Both were shocked at Prime Minister's complete misunderstanding basic United States position re future military aid to Libya as outlined to him by me on October 22. Stackhouse reports that Prime Minister believes that (1) Americans will take over British military commitments in Libya and in entire middle east; (2) Americans will supply arms for expanded Libyan army (Prime Minister twice mentioned goal of ten thousand and implication strong he believes Americans committed supply arms for army this size); (3) British military mission will continue have primary training responsibility training increment of thousand men to be equipped by US; (4) MAAG role will be serve as liaison between Embassy and Libyan military authorities and will not have training responsibilities.

Sachs reminded Prime Minister Libyan-American agreement that US to train and equip thousand man increment and both restated US position, namely, that we not taking up British commitments in area but are willing discuss with Libyans their training and equipment requirements. Prime Minister, recognizing completeness of misunderstanding, suggested that interpreting at October 22 meeting (done by British Embassy officer) might be cause.

Comment: Sachs reports that throughout conversation Prime Minister made it clear more than once that Libyans have no intention of allowing British renege unilaterally on long-standing commitment to train and equip Libyan army. At one point he commented that Libyans had not sought review military arrangements. To contrary

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contrary, British Ambassador had requested interview and had "brought along American Ambassador". It evident to us here that Libyan bargaining position is hardening along lines reported in EMBTEL 288. (Further evidence follows in next cable inform comments to press by Prime Minister.)

It is further evident that, as this Embassy has consistently reported for past three years, US would be badly advised to insert itself further in middle of what has always been primarily Anglo-Libyan affair and what now threatens to become Anglo-Libyan quarrel. Embassy reiterates that, beyond repetition by me personally to Prime Minister of US position on arms assistance for purpose making record absolutely clear, we have no feasible course of action other than to stand aside attentively until British and Libyans sort out their position.

TAPPIN

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